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Reaction of the *Aswaja* Group to the *Wahhabism* Movement in Aceh

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ABSTRACT

The discussion on *Wahhabism* is not a new discussion for the people of Aceh, since the PUSA era this discussion has been developed, because the PUSA was "accused" by traditional clerics of carrying out the *Wahhabi* movement in Aceh. This movement is now being resurfaced when those who call themselves *Aswaja* lovers see the existence of *Wahhabism* and the *Wahhabi* movement preaching throughout Aceh. According to *Aswaja*, the *Wahhabi* missionary movement is contrary to Islamic values and the creeds that are adhered to by the people of Aceh. In this context, *Aswaja's* claim to be heretical is increasing along with the high *Wahhabi* preaching. In *Aswaja's* view, *Wahabime* in Aceh has started to gain momentum because they have controlled a number of mosques to spread their *da'wah*, so that several mosques have become a bone of contention between *Aswaja* and *Wahhabis* and a number of recitation sessions have been forcibly disbanded by the *Aswaja* group. *Aswaja's* contest with *Wahhabism* in Aceh is now a little disturbing to the social and religious fabric of society, because various accusations of heresy and infidel have finally become words commonly heard in society. The implications for the *wahabism* movement became even worse when the Aceh government established the criteria for the *Aswaja* creed through the MPU fatwa No. 04 of 2011. With the issuance of this fatwa, all schools whose *aqidah* is not in accordance with *Aswaja* must be rejected from developing in Aceh. *Aswaja's* contest with *Wahhabism* in Aceh is now a little disturbing to the social and religious fabric of society, because various accusations of heresy and infidel have finally become words commonly heard in society. The implications for the *wahabism* movement became even

worse when the Aceh government established the criteria for the *Aswaja* creed through the MPU fatwa No. 04 of 2011. With the issuance of this fatwa, all schools whose *aqidah* is not in accordance with *Aswaja* must be rejected from developing in Aceh.

Keywords: *Movement, Aswaja, Wahhabism, Aceh.*

INTRODUCTION

The public debate on the *Wahhabi* movement is getting more and more prominent, this phenomenon could be because each party has a balanced argument in winning the course of the discussion. In fact, not a few of those who lost the debate ended in blasphemy because of the issue of the *Wahhabi* missionary movement. When referring to past history, the arrival of Islam to Aceh since the 9th century AD was never carried out through violence. Islamic teachings entered Aceh peacefully so that people could easily accept teachings which later became an integral part of their lives.¹ As a noble teaching, the people of Aceh have made Islam the foundation of their lives. When Islam becomes the basis of life, then the religious system also colors their entire daily basis.

When Aceh was still in the form of a kingdom, disagreements regarding religious issues also occurred. Nonetheless, Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-136 AD) was able to make Islamic law the only official teaching of the kingdom.² Thus Islamic teachings become a system and ideology of society that must be defended and defended from various disturbances at any time.³ When the people of Aceh have made Islam their ideology, any other ideology that will enter will automatically be rejected. This is also inseparable from the role of the *ulama* in the past who constructed the concept of *kaphe* (infidel) for every colonial nation that came to Aceh.⁴ So that the Acehnese people collectively

¹Amirul Hadi, *Aceh History, Culture and Traditions* (Jakarta: Indonesian Torch Foundation, 2010), 248.

²Nuruddin Ar-Raniri, *Bustanu's Salatin*, Chapter II, Chapter 13, Edited by T. Iskandar (Kuala Lumpur: Language and Library Council, 1966), 35-36. Muchtar Aziz, "A Historical Review of the Implementation of Islamic Sharia during the Islamic Empire and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in Aceh", in, TH Thalhas and Choirul Fuad Yusuf, *Education and Islamic Sharia in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam* (Jakarta: Gaalura Pase, 2007), 73-74.

³Amirul Hadi, "Exploring the Meaning of Jihad for the Acehnese: A Study of the Prang Sabi Saga", in, R. Michael Feener, Patrick Daly, and Anthony Reid (Editors), *Mapping Aceh's Past* (Denpasar Bali: Larasan Library, 2011), 188. Firdaus, "The Role of the Teungku Dayah Organization in the Implementation of Islamic Sharia in Aceh", *Dissertation of UIN North Sumatra* (Medan: UIN North Sumatra, 2017), 336.

⁴Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *Republican Uprising Case Darul Islam Aceh* (Jakarta: Graffiti Main Library, 1990), 32

reject the arrival of the *kaphe* peoples to Aceh through the high fighting spirit of the people, one of these enthusiasms is pumped through the saga of prang sabi.⁵

The strong Islamic ideology of the Acehnese was also inseparable from the role of Aceh as the center for the study of Southeast Asian Islamic education at that time, so that many professors from Arab countries came to Aceh.⁶ Apart from being a place of learning, Aceh is a transit point for pilgrims from various countries, seeing that the mobility and relationship between Aceh and Mecca is so harmonious that Aceh is nicknamed the Veranda of Mecca. For some Acehnese scholars, they took advantage of the opportunity to go on pilgrimage to deepen religious knowledge from scholars in Arab countries as was done by Abdurrauf As Singkili, who spent up to 19 years studying in Arab countries,⁷ Likewise with Teungku Chik Di Tiro and Teungku Chik Pante Kulu. During the war with the Dutch, the tradition of studying Arabic was still high, in the 1920s Tgk. Abdullah Ujong Rimba, Mr. Abdul Hamid Samalanga and Tgk. M. Nur El Ibrahimy is a scholar who helped deepen his knowledge to Saudi Arabia. Several contemporary scholars such as Tgk. Muhibuddin Waly, Muhammad Nasir Waly, Tgk. Syamaun Risyad, a scholar who always enlightens the community.

When the Islamic spirit pumped continuously by the Ulama into the people of Aceh, making Islam an ideology of resistance when the colonial peoples (Portuguese, Dutch and Japanese) imposed their beliefs on the people of Aceh. Their actions, in the tradition of thinking that the Acehnese must be fought not only because they do not share their faith, but those who also interfere with the life of the Acehnese people and their religion.⁸ The concept of *kaphe* (infidel) then experienced an increase, that is, anyone who helps the enemy of religion can be categorized as a *kaphe*.⁹ It was this view that later led to the emergence of a social revolution in Aceh.¹⁰

The concept of an enemy had also occurred when Aceh had joined Indonesia and the reins of state leadership at that time were held by President Soekarno. The fate of Aceh at the beginning of independence was truly tragic

⁵T. Ibrahim Alfian, *Dutch Colonial War in Aceh* (Banda Aceh: Aceh Documentation and Information Center, 1997), 36. Anita Iskandariata, *The Meaning of the Tale of Prang Sabil in Aceh* (Banda Aceh: Ar-Raniry Press in Collaboration with AK. Group Yogyakarta, 2007), 4-5.

⁶Muhibuddin Waly Al-Khalidy, "Dayah Manyang in the Perspective of Ulama", in, *Islamic Higher Studies* (Banda Aceh: Bureau of Privileges and People's Welfare, Regional Secretariat of NAD Province, 2008), 190.

⁷Wan Muhammad Saghir Abdullah, *Treasures of the Southeast Asian Library*, Vol I, (Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Fathimiyah, 1991), 128-131

⁸E. Gobe and Adriaanse, *Advice from CS Hurgronje During His Service to the Dutch East Indies Government 1889-1936*, Terj Sukarsi (Jakarta: INIS, 1991), 111.

⁹C. Snouck Hugronje, *The Acehnese*, Vol. I, Terj AWS O'Sullivan (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1906), 177.

¹⁰Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *Rebellion of the People* (1990), 26-27.

apart from not being given the constitutional implementation of Islamic law, the province that had been formed was later joined to the Province of North Sumatra.¹¹ In this case Indonesia has been classified as an enemy because it is considered to be disturbing *din al-Islam*.¹² Because of that the concept of the enemy at that time was no longer infidel but included Muslims who obstructed the implementation of Islamic law in Aceh. The concept of *kaphe* has recently come back to the fore when there are groups trying to force a way of religion according to their group's wishes, such a phenomenon which then creates heretical claims to other people or groups. So that from here then gave birth to tensions in religion, these tensions were born, among others, from the preaching and opinions of *Wahhabism* groups in print and electronic media locally and nationally. This then has provoked the *Aswaja* group as well as a handful of academics to reject all forms of *Wahhabism* as deviant sects. This rejection movement in Aceh sometimes does not challenge the school of thought of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, but more to the difference in point of view in the procedures for worship, namely between the 8 cycles of *tarawih* prayers, sermons without using a stick and not repeating the sermon. The next situation, they not only shouted *Wahhabism* as a heretical ideology, but they were already at the stage of seizing mosques managed by those who were considered *Wahhabism*, and giving the government an ultimatum to close all mosques managed by *Wahhabism*. The movement against *Wahhabism* is of course contrary to the fatwa issued by the Aceh MPU, because the MPU's fatwa does not mention *Wahhabism* as a deviant sect. Even studies on *Wahhabism* have been carried out from the past until now at Islamic universities in the world.

The *Aswaja* group's claim about *Wahhabi* deviance in Aceh has not discouraged parents from forbidding their sons and daughters from studying in the Middle East (Mecca, Medina, Syria). incidentally as a country where *Wahhabism* was born, grew and developed. They are very happy and proud when their children are accepted at Al-Azhar University, Medina University or other reputable universities in the Middle East.

Based on the problems above, the researcher considers that this research is important research to be known and used by ordinary people, community leaders and also the government as a policy maker for all potentials that lead to conflict in society.

¹¹Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *Rebellion of the People*, (1990), 96. HM Thamrin Z, and Edy Mulyana, *The Melting of the Province of Aceh* (Banda Aceh: Archives and Libraries of the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2008), 129.

¹²Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion* (Singapore: ISAS, 1985), 7.

RESEARCH METHODS

This research is a qualitative research with a phenomenological approach.¹³ As a qualitative research, the findings do not have to be obtained through mathematical logic, numerical principles or statistical methods.¹⁴ Qualitative methods can be used to uncover and understand something behind a phenomenon that was not known before.¹⁵ For this reason, it is hoped that this qualitative method can be used to describe and analyze the understanding of the *Aswaja* group and campus academics about the essence and existence of *Wahhabism*.

This research will take research locations in Banda Aceh, Langsa Aceh Timur, Meulaboh Aceh Barat, Tapaktuan Aceh Selatan and Bireuen as centers for the growth of large Islamic religious leaders who firmly defend *Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah*. The choice of location as above is very reasonable because it can represent the research area, namely the East, North, West and South Coasts. Likewise with the academics who were interviewed, from the point of view of domicile they were also in the East route (IAIN Cot Kala Langsa), the North route (UIN Ar-Raniry Banda Aceh), the West area (STAIN Meulaboh), and the South area (STAI Tapaktuan).

The selected informants consist of academics who are pro towards *Wahhabism* and those who reject *Wahhabism* in Aceh. While the informants among the selected dayah are the tengku-teungku dayah. In this study, 22 informants were interviewed, they consisted of 4 people from UIN Ar-Raniry,

¹³Phenomenology in a broad sense is the science of phenomena or anything that appears. In this case phenomenology is a philosophical approach centered on the analysis of phenomena that overwhelm human consciousness. This term was introduced by JH Lambert in 1764 to refer to the theory of apparitions. This theory, along with the theories of truth, logic and semiotics, constitutes his four philosophical disciplines. Since Lambert this term has been used in various disciplines. Kant, for example, uses phenomenology in his *Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science as Phenomenology*. This section describes motion and rest as general characteristics that characterize each symptom. Besides Kant, Hegel in *Phenomenology of Spirit* also details the stages that allow humans to rise to the level of universal reason. Likewise with Husserl who was very concerned about the use of this term and put it in parentheses as an initial attitude in approaching the problem of existence while exploring the essences of each phenomenon. Lorens Bagus, *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1996), 234-235. Harun Hadiwijono, *Essence of Western Philosophy 2* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1980), 143. Harry Hamersma, *Modern Western Figures* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1992), 26-44. Harun Hadiwijono, *Essence of Western Philosophy 2* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1980), 143. Harry Hamersma, *Modern Western Figures* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1992), 26-44. Harun Hadiwijono, *Essence of Western Philosophy 2* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1980), 143. Harry Hamersma, *Modern Western Figures* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1992), 26-44.

¹⁴Deddy Mulyana, *New Paradigm Qualitative Research Methodology of Communication Studies and Other Social Sciences*, (Bandung: RosdaKarya, 2001), 15

¹⁵Anselm Strauss & Juliet Corbin, *Fundamentals of Qualitative Research*, Trans. Muhammad Shodiq and Imam Muttaqin, (Yogyakarta, Student Library: 2003), 34

4 people from IAIN Langsa, 4 people from STAIN Meulaboh. Meanwhile, from the *teungku dayah*, 2 people from Bireuen Regency, 2 people from East Aceh Regency, Kota Banda Aceh 2 people, West Aceh Regency 2 people, and South Aceh Regency 2 people.

In this study, data collection techniques were carried out through three stages, namely observation, in-depth interviews, and documentation. These data will be analyzed through three stages, namely: First, analysis of primary data, namely analysis that takes into account the main information or data obtained in a study. Second, secondary data analysis, an analysis of findings from other researchers who may use different and more subtle methods. Third, meta-analysis, an analysis of data that has been collected or compiled and analyzed from several studies. In this study the three types of analysis will be used according to the data obtained.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. The Beginning of the *Wahhabis*

Wahabi in terminologically have meaning, teaching, understanding or *da'wah* movement pioneered by Shaykh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab in the 12 H (18 M) century.¹⁶ He fought with his followers in the Najd region, then his influence spread to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and outside Saudi Arabia including Indonesia and other Muslim countries. While the *Wahhabis* mean, everyone among the Muslims who agreed, followed, and supported the *da'wah* movement of Seikh Muhammad bin Abd Wahab and the ulema who continued his *da'wah*.¹⁷

Although the *Wahhabi* movement was still centered in Arabia in the 18th century, this movement has shaken the world. The Turkish Empire and some of the colonial powers who were in power were very afraid of this movement, because *Wahhabism* was seen as a spirit generator for nations. There is a perception that when a *Wahhabi* enters a country, he will open the eyes of the population to oppose the invaders. Because the mission of the *Wahhabi* movement is to reaffirm the pure teachings of monotheism, and eliminate everything that will lead to polytheism, for them there is no place to fear except Allah SWT. Therefore they strongly oppose the notion that leads someone to

¹⁶Al-Haqir Mahfuz Muhammad al-Khalil, *The Aqidah of the Sunnah and Its Opposition to the Wahhabism* (Johor: Secretariat for Managing Aqidah and Sharia Issues of the Johor State Islamic Council, 2008), 5.

¹⁷Abu Muhammad Waskito, *Being Fair to Wahhabis* (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2011), 178

think old school, because thinking old school is the same as leading someone to a frozen religion.¹⁸

The emergence of the *Wahhabi* movement coincided with the rise of Europe. Where at that time Europe was repairing various deficiencies, starting from the political, economic and strengthening aspects of scientific studies in various fields, as well as spreading scientific findings throughout the world. Through these efforts they easily conquer the world. While the Islamic world is still preoccupied with fundamental problems, namely "away from" secular (worldly) science, so that Muslims are in decline. This phenomenon was ~~actually on the inability~~ of Muslims at that time to adapt to the modern scientific findings of Western nations. The above political weaknesses, followed by the "worrying" religious understanding of Muslims, became the driving factor for the emergence of the *Wahhabi* movement in the Arabian peninsula. Where many Muslims are no longer guided by the Koran and hadith as the main source of religion and knowledge. At that time their religious and scientific enthusiasm was replaced by a fatalist attitude and guided by a mystical lifestyle.

In addition to the several causes above, the factor of poverty that hit Muslims at that time was the cause of crime in various places. The clan system is still strong, especially in Najd which is a vast desert area and is inhabited by many Bedouin people. The tribal system and territorial conditions contributed to their economic decline and chaos. Likewise with the Hijaz, since the Abasiya period this area was in a weak state and was always under the control of certain groups.¹⁹ Thus they never controlled trade because the route was controlled by powerful tribes, which caused the population to live in poverty and deprivation. Agriculture and animal husbandry which are their daily livelihood cannot guarantee their economic life. This is due to security that is prone to war and chaos and robberies committed by other tribes. There is no Shari'a or legislation that can authoritatively protect people's lives, except for the will of the rulers and their followers. As a result, the population of Nejed and the Arabian peninsula in general live in poverty.

In the field of religion, it is dominated by the religious practices of the Sufis, even so, the morality of society is at its lowest point. This low morality is due to the introduction of Roman and Greek culture which has had a negative

¹⁸Akhilesh Pillamarri, "The Radicalization of South Asian Islam: Saudi Money and the Spread of Wahhabism", 20 October 2014. <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/12/20/the-radicalization-of-south-asian-islam-saudi-money-and-the-spread-of-Wahabism/>.Access November 25, 2022.

¹⁹Abu Muhammad Waskito, *Reconciling Ahlus Sunnah in the Archipelago Looking for Points of Agreement Between Asyariayah and Wahhabiyah* (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2012), 134.

effect on the Arab nation. The *Wahhabi* movement believes that the influence of other nations, such as the Greeks, Persians and Turks, has created a deviant religious pattern. According to *Wahhabism*, accepting diversity of opinion as something that is equally valid and correct is one of the causes of disunity and backwardness of Muslims.²⁰ *Wahhabis* cannot accept such a phenomenon and are of course at odds with the Sunnis. The *Wahhabi* movement in its next stage advocated eliminating all heresy that arose in the medieval period in order to return to the pure teachings contained in the Qur'an and Hadith. The *Wahhabi* movement also encourages Muslims to perform *ijtihad* which was declared closed by previous scholars.²¹ The *Wahhabi* movement then became stronger when it received political support from Muhammad bin Sa'ud, a Dar'iyah ruler (Zainal Abidin Syihab, 1986: 25).²² At the support given by Muhammad Sa'ud, morally and materially, has contributed to elevating the *Wahhabi* movement. For Muhammad Sa'ud, the movement launched by the *Wahhabis*, politically and religiously, really helped him to control the Arabian peninsula. Meanwhile, for Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, Muhammad Sa'ud's full support as a businessman and founder of the Saudi kingdom for *Wahhabism* was felt to be more than sufficient for the future of this movement.

2. *Wahhabism* in Aceh

The "*Wahabi*" movement in Aceh has already begun to be seen in Aceh when the PUSA held a congress in Langsa. Where at that time, Mr. Abdullah Umar Lam U and Mr. M. Daud Beureueh in the formation of the Langsa PUSA branch on March 24 1940 explicitly stated that he wanted to eradicate falsehood in religion which could damage the body and soul of the Acehnese people. From the statements of the two scholars, PUSA aspires to shape the people of Aceh to become an Islamic society. With such an attitude, it is certain that PUSA is dealing directly with those who are opposed to PUSA's idea of struggle. Parties who feel attacked by PUSA are traditional clerics and *uleebalangs*. To corroborate this statement they issued announcements to criticize the traditional clerics.

This attitude has made many traditional clerics and *uleebalangs* hostile to the PUSA movement. According to the PUSA, the policies carried out by the *uleebalang* have caused a lot of suffering to the people, such as imposing forced labor (compulsory work for every man aged 18-55 years for public projects for 12 days a year), and withdrawal of *belasting* (tax of assets that residents often

²⁰Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Save Islam from Puritan Muslims*, trans. Helmi Mustafa (Jakarta: Serambi, 2006), 63-64.

²¹Edward Mortimer, *Islam and Power*, Trans. Enna Hadi and Rahmani Astuti (Bandung: Mizan, 1984), 96

²²Zainal Abidin Syihab, *Wahhabism and International Islamic Reform* (Jakarta: Pustaka Dian, 1986), 25.

referred to as a “head tax”, because the poorest-poorest of the population still have to pay f 2, per adult population). This fact is not only objected by religious leaders, Twk. Mahmud, who at that time was Aceh's representative in the Volksraad, was also worried about the taxes imposed by the *uleebalangs*.²³

The tax collection carried out by the *uleebalang* was almost the same as that applied by the French kings. All the people were taxed at the will of the king, they were forced to work without being given wages. The people are exploited in such a way that it seems to them that they belong to the king. Such an assumption is found in *hadih maja* “nyawong di Puteu Allah, darah gapah di Teuku Po (life belongs to Allah, blood and body fat belong to *uleebalang*).²⁴ Apart from forced labor and taxes, another source of conflict with the *uleebalang* is the management of the Baitul Mal. Some *uleebalangs* are transparent in managing Baitul Mal, such as Sagi XXII, but many *uleebalangs* who manage Baitul Mal are not transparent.²⁵ Apart from the *uleebalang*, PUSA also encountered conflicts with traditional clerics and *tarekat* leaders who still practiced *kurafat* and superstitions. For PUSA, religious practices that are *khilafiah* must be eliminated, this of course faces challenges from the traditional clerics who have been practicing it.²⁶

The PUSA movement above adopts the pattern of the movement carried out by *Wahhabism*, one of the similarities is eliminating issues that smell of khilafiah and keeping people away from the practice of superstition and superstition, because such practices can bring people closer to polytheism.

3. The Clash of Aswaja and Wahhabism in Aceh

Aswaja's protest against *Wahhabism*, although carried out evenly throughout Aceh, has not yet led to acts of violence that have led to open conflict in society. This is very different from the anti-Wahabi movement in other places outside Aceh. Al-Chaidar, an academic in Aceh, sees that the *Wahhabism* that are developing in Aceh take at least three models of movement. First, *Wahhabism* Shururi or *Wahhabism* who are considered to be against the celebration of the Prophet's birthday, rejecting the call to prayer twice, anti-visiting graves, anti-tahlil and anti-jihad, and often considering people who oppose the government as *bughat* (rebels) that are against Islamic law. Second, *Wahhabi* Jihadi, namely groups that are more focused on jihad, and try to fight against every government

²³M. Isa Sulaiman, *History of Aceh...* (1997), 58.

²⁴M. Nur El Ibrahimy, Mr. Muhammad Daud Beureueh His Role in the Upheaval in Aceh (Jakarta: Mount Agung, 1982), 84.

²⁵Agus Budi Wibowo, Iriani Dewi Wanti, and Iskandar Eko Priyotomo, *Dynamics and...* (2005), 55-56

²⁶Several community practices that have received PUSA's attention in Aceh that must be eradicated include: Asking for the graves of teungku which are considered sacred, worshiping objects that are considered sacred, circumcising certain mosques to make pilgrimages to. Hamka, *The Development of Indonesian Spirituality*, (Jakarta: Crescent Star, 1971), 69.

policy. *Wahhabi* Jihadi once appeared under the name Tanzhim Al Qaeda Veranda of Mecca (TQSM). From this group, it was found that many activities had been carried out after the disclosure of *I'dad* (war preparation/training) activities at Bukit Jalin, Aceh Besar in 2010. The *Wahhabi* Jihadi group is now more calm and chooses the path of *da'wah* bil wisdom in their daily lives. Third, *Wahhabism Takfiri* who likes to accuse others outside their group of being heretics or even infidels.

The *Wahhabis* even though they carry the same flag, yet they accuse each other, accuse each other, of being misguided. For example, *Wahabi Shururi* often accuses *Wahabi Jihadi* of being *bughat*. Meanwhile, *Wahhabi Jihadi* prioritizes *mahdhah* worship (rituals) and avoids friction with any party. Meanwhile, *Wahhabism* and *takfiri* are very reactive and accuse the jihadists of being heretical, heretical or infidel towards anyone who does not want to accept Al-Baghdadi's caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Through social media, *Wahhabi Takfiri* groups spread calls and threats in an intolerant manner.²⁷

The existence of these three *Wahhabi* groups tends to be closed, their *da'wah* activities are prioritized to their group rather than to the general public. They are aware that the general public is not easily persuaded to accept open preaching from them. So, the middle way is to strengthen the cadres through the study and recitation of books written by *Wahhabi* figures while "capturing" the hearts of the congregation in the mosque to listen to the contents of the studies they are conducting. Winning the hearts of the congregation is also not easy, because almost all mosques are monitored by *Aswaja* followers, so that tensions ensue at several mosques in Aceh. Recently the congregation of the Ibn Sina RSUZA mosque stopped the *da'wah* delivered by one of the ustad who was accused of being "*Wahhabi*".

According to Tu Min, the Acehnesse charismatic cleric, the rapid growth of *Wahhabism* in Aceh recently is because they have strong cadres. In the past, no Acehnesse became cadres, now many Acehnesse have become cadres. Through their cadres, they have been able to influence the community through publications against *Aswaja* in Aceh.²⁸ Open preaching delivered by "*Wahhabi*" in Banda Aceh according to Tgk. Kaifaruddin, a member of the South Aceh MPU, was not as excited as what was done in South Aceh, because the *Wahhabi da'wah* in South Aceh was not as developed as in other areas, they made their own congregation, and in their daily lives they wore robes and prancing pants for

²⁷Al-Chaidar, "Clash of Schools in Aceh: A Study of Internal Conflict Between Adherents of the Syafi'i and Wahhabi Schools of Islamic Religion", <https://steemit.com/mazhab/@alchaidar/benturan-antar-mazhab-in-aceh-study-about-internal-conflict-between-followers-of-religious-Islam-syafii-mazhab-and-wahabi>. Access November 18, 2022

²⁸Interview with Abu Tumin, Aceh Ulama.

men, and women wore veils as clothes. people in Arabic. They have a strong network, one of the networks is the Medan Al-Khairiah Foundation.²⁹

The perspective on *Wahhabism* in Aceh varies widely, some accept it and not a few reject it. The pros and cons of this were very clearly seen during the parade in Banda Aceh on September 10 2015.³⁰ For some people who claim to be *Aswaja* lovers are radically against *Wahhabism* even though they do not understand *Wahhabi* teachings. And on the other hand, several academics also questioned the opposition to *Wahhabism*.³¹ as a result of these pros and cons, a war of opinion was inevitable from groups that were pro as well as those against *Aswaja-Wahhabi*.³²

There are interesting things if we learn from the rejection of *Wahhabism* in Aceh, where the students were very enthusiastic to oppose *Wahhabism* and all deviant views in Aceh. According to the santri, all *Aswaja* adherents must be wary of and despise *Wahhabism*, if necessary through demonstrations. The santri's perspective is of course very different from the way the teungku dayah does in opposing the *Wahhabis*. The teachers are softer in explaining to the students about various *Wahhabi* heresies, they tend to convey through examples that make sense by making a number of comparisons in the book, thus the students will understand more quickly.³³

Abi Samsuar, one of the academics in West Aceh saw that even though the ulema gave softer explanations to the students, it did not mean that they accepted *Wahhabism*. This effort was made more to appease the students so they would not take anarchic actions. For my teungku, the existence of *Wahhabism* has actually damaged the religious traditions of the people of Aceh, such as prohibiting tahlilan for the dead, prohibiting celebrating birthdays, prohibiting visiting graves, prohibiting recitation at graves, and prohibiting dawn qunut. For the *Wahhabis*, the rituals performed by the teungku and most of the people of Aceh are bid'ah, because all of them have no guidance in the Shari'a.³⁴

For the *Wahhabis*, they are not aware that there are "Islamic" traditions such as peusijek in Acehese society. This tradition is no longer contradictory because all the procedures have been adjusted to the Shari'a. When it is in accordance with the Shari'a, it is no longer included in the category of bidah dhalah (heretical) as conceptualized by the *Wahhabis*.

²⁹Interview with Mr. Kaifaruddin, a student in South Aceh, 25 July 2022.

³⁰"Aswaja Crowd Crowds of City", Serambi Indonesia, 11 September 2015.

³¹Hasanuddin Yusuf Adan, "Aswaja Parade, What's the Profit and Loss", Serambi Indonesia, 17 September 2015.

³²Muhammad Iqbal Jalil, Aswaja Parade, Why Panic?", Serambi Indonesia, 29 September 2015.

³³Interview with Mr. Muzakkir, a student in Banda Aceh, 17 August 2022

³⁴Interview with Muhsinuddin, Vice Chairman of STAIN Tgk. Dirundeng West Aceh, 24 November 2022

According to Mr. Burhanuddin, in order to fortify the community from *Wahhabi* influence, the *dayah* is obliged to strengthen the *Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jamaah* creed so that the community does not become talkative when other teachings influence them. If the *aqeedah* is strong, it will be difficult for other understandings to penetrate it. The task of the *teungku* in teaching the community at the *bale-bale seumubuet* is to strengthen faith, besides teaching other sciences that are really needed by ordinary people.³⁵ So to defend *Aswaja's* *aqeedah* from *Wahhabi* influence, according to M. Faisal Y, the *santri* together with their teacher must *puthen ata butoi dan pugadoh yang salah* (defending the right and eliminating the wrong) because the *Wahhabis* are real enemies that must be watched over, because they have tarnished the *aqeedah* and oppose anything that has been taught by scholars and *ambiya* in our area.³⁶ There is something interesting about the presence of *Wahhabism* in Aceh, even though these teachings and movements have received rejection from various groups, the MPU as an institution entitled to issue fatwas, has never issued any fatwa against the *da'wah* movement and thoughts of *wahabism* in Aceh.

CONCLUSION

A wave of rejection of *wahabism* occurred everywhere, some did it openly as happened at the At-Taqwa Pidie Jaya mosque on July 28 2018, or what happened at the Ibnu Sina RSUZA mosque on July 31 2018 rejection in other forms against *wahabism* was also carried out by those who call themselves *Aswaja* through condemnations downloaded on YouTube or other social media.

The recent series of rejection of *Wahhabism* in Aceh has been correlated with the *Aswaja* demonstration ahead of the 2017 gubernatorial election. Thousands of people who called themselves *Aswaja* lovers at that time took to the streets shouting rejection of *Wahhabism* from Aceh, although most of them did not understand what they were rejecting, this was where they invited many people to question the substance of the rejection of *Wahhabism* carried out by *Aswaja*, one of the academics who also questioned the substance of the *Aswaja* demonstration through an opinion published in the *Serambi Indonesia* daily, Hasanuddin Yusuf Adan. His question was then responded to by the followers of *Aswaja*, some responded mildly and not a few criticized this opinion.

Aswaja's protest against *Wahhabism*, although carried out evenly throughout Aceh, has not yet led to acts of violence that have led to open conflict in society. Although a number of concerns continue to surround the social and religious life in Aceh. Because the target of his accusations is sometimes inappropriate, such as generalizing that all Middle Eastern alumni are

³⁵Interview Mr. Burhanuddin 25 November 2022.

³⁶M. Faisal. Y, Tastafi Pidie Jaya Study Committee, 29 November 2022

Wahhabism, even though this accusation is not necessarily true. According to the results of research conducted by Al-Chaidar, *Wahhabism* in Aceh took at least three models of movement. First, *Wahhabism* Shururi or *Wahhabism* who are considered to be against the celebration of the Prophet's birthday, rejecting the call to prayer twice, anti-visiting graves, anti-tahlil and anti-jihad, and often considering people who oppose the government as bughat (rebels) that are against Islamic law. Second, *Wahhabi* Jihadi, namely groups that are more focused on jihad, and try to fight against every government policy. *Wahhabi* Jihadi once appeared under the name Tanzhim Al Qaeda Veranda of Mecca (TQSM). From this group, it was found that many activities had been carried out after the disclosure of I'dad (war preparation/training) activities at Bukit Jalin, Aceh Besar in 2010. The *Wahhabi* Jihadi group is now more calm and chooses the path of *da'wah* bil wisdom in their daily lives. Third, *Wahhabism* Takfiri who likes to accuse others outside their group of being heretics or even infidels. Of the three models above, what is of general concern in society is precisely the wahabi shururi, because this *Wahhabi* group opposes the habits practiced by the people of Aceh. and trying to fight every government policy. *Wahhabi* Jihadi once appeared under the name Tanzhim Al Qaeda Veranda of Mecca (TQSM). From this group, it was found that many activities had been carried out after the disclosure of I'dad (war preparation/training) activities at Bukit Jalin, Aceh Besar in 2010. The *Wahhabi* Jihadi group is now more calm and chooses the path of *da'wah* bil wisdom in their daily lives. Third, *Wahhabism* Takfiri who likes to accuse others outside their group of being heretics or even infidels. Of the three models above, what is of general concern in society is precisely the wahabi shururi, because this *Wahhabi* group opposes the habits practiced by the people of Aceh. and trying to fight every government policy. *Wahhabi* Jihadi once appeared under the name Tanzhim Al Qaeda Veranda of Mecca (TQSM). From this group, it was found that many activities had been carried out after the disclosure of I'dad (war preparation/training) activities at Bukit Jalin, Aceh Besar in 2010. The *Wahhabi* Jihadi group is now more calm and chooses the path of *da'wah* bil wisdom in their daily lives. Third, *Wahhabism* Takfiri who likes to accuse others outside their group of being heretics or even infidels. Of the three models above, what is of general concern in society is precisely the wahabi shururi, because this *Wahhabi* group opposes the habits practiced by the people of Aceh. From this group, it was found that many activities had been carried out after the disclosure of I'dad (war preparation/training) activities at Bukit Jalin, Aceh Besar in 2010. The *Wahhabi* Jihadi group is now more calm and chooses the path of *da'wah* bil wisdom in their daily lives. Third, *Wahhabism* Takfiri who likes to accuse others outside their group of being heretics or even infidels. Of the three models above, what is of general concern in society is precisely the wahabi

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Wowhabi in Aceh is currently taking different forms in all districts/cities in Aceh. They tend to follow the moment and adjust according to the characteristics of the existing society. And for now their *da'wah* activities are prioritized to their group rather than to the general public. They are aware that the general public is not easily persuaded to accept open preaching. So the alternative solution they offer is to strengthen cadres through studies and sermons while "winning" the hearts of people who are sympathetic to their *da'wah* movement.

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